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What economic and social factors can explain the new turn to the left in Latin America?

Updated: Jun 13


gustavo petro colombia

JUAN BARRETO/AFP


The "left turn" ("giro a la izquierda" in Spanish) in Latin America refers to a phenomenon that occurred at the end of the 1990s with the arrival of the socialist Hugo Chávez in power in Venezuela. It refers to a political turn toward left-wing government in the region. This phenomenon reached its peak in the 2000s with the successive triumphs of the left in many other Latin American countries. 13 countries out of the 20 countries in the region shifted to the left. It is often referred to as the "pink tide". Elected governments were oriented towards social progress fostered by economic growth and a commodity supercycle, which had enabled the implementation of redistributive policies. After the end of the cycle, in 2009, the right came back to power and in 2016 with a majority of right-wing governments in Latin America.


Latin America new turn to the left pink tide

However, Latin American seems to be experiencing a new turn to the left with, for example, the coming to power of Andrés Manuel López Obrador in December 2018 as head of Mexico. In Colombia, Gustavo Petro became president in August 2022. In Mexico, this is the first time we have had a left-wing government in more than 40 years of right-wing governments in power. For Colombia, this is the first time in more than 200 years.

To what extent have the accumulated failures of right-wing governments since the 2010s led to the return of the left to power?


The end of the 2009 commodity supercycle, Latin American countries saw the return of right-wing governments and highlighted the failures of the countries’ economic and political models. The fall in commodity prices and a slowdown in Chinese growth led to the expansion of Latin American countries' trade deficits and the limitation of social programs, which were mainly financed by revenues from commodity exports.


Venezuela and Brazil have suffered greatly from the decline in their financial revenues.

On the one hand, the reactions of Latin American governments have not necessarily been adapted to the context and even worsened the country's economic situation. In the case of Argentina, President Mauricio Macri came to power after this period of prosperity, and when he left, he left the country's economy in a bad state. Argentina's foreign debt in dollars amounted to up to 43.2% of the country's GDP in 2018 and up to 58% in June 2019. Macri and his disastrous economic record have led to an economic crisis. The country was facing an external debt of about $100 billion, a devaluation of the peso, capital-flight and inflation. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has lent Argentina $57 billion to avoid default payments and to secure its market, but it was not successful.


In general, Latin American economic systems are characterized by high levels of financial speculation and precarious intraregional trade systems. According to ECLAC figures, only 25% of Latin America's trade is carried out within the region, reflecting the reliance of the region on countries of the North.


On the other hand, the well-being of the countries in the region depends very much on the economic situation, which also shows the failures of the system adopted by the countries. Years of low growth, below 3% from 2014 to 2019 alternated with other crisis years from 2017 to 2020. It was therefore in economic instability that the right came back to power in Latin America. The right had to recover from the first financial difficulties that began with the fall in commodity prices. In addition, Latin America's economies are not strong enough and rely heavily on the global economic situation.

In addition to economic failures, Latin American governments are characterized by significant corruption and often fail to curb violence and drug trafficking.


According to Transparency International's (CPI) Corruption Perceptions Index, in 2018, corruption in the Latin American region reached 32 out of 100 points. Corruption increases poverty, hinders development and affects the governability of a country. It is worth highlighting a very important corruption case that has not only eroded democracy, but also the economy of the region: the Odebrecht case.


This case has had devastating consequences for 12 Latin American countries. The corruption investigation carried out on Petrobras in Brazil, called Operation Lava Jato, led to the arrest of Marcelo Odebrecht, president of the oil company. Indeed, the investigation revealed the existence of a "corruption department" from which resources were provided to officials in several countries in exchange for public works contracts. The investigation revealed in 2017 that Odebrecht had funded elections in El Salvador, Venezuela, Brazil, the Dominican Republic and Panama. However, right-wing politicians were not the only ones involved. In Brazil, the former leftist president Lula da Silva was involved in the scandal and imprisoned.


Moreover, in 2020, political instability in Peru caused the country to change presidents 2 times in less than a week, stoking the anger of Peruvians and leading to violent protests in the country.


Similarly, regulation of campaign funding is insufficient in Latin America because the risks of corruption are not measured and facilitate the entry of undue money into politics due to its lack of transparency. Only 17 of the countries in the region require their parties to report regularly on their contributions and require their candidates to declare contributions received during campaigns (International IDEA, 2014).

In addition, Latin American societies are known to be particularly violent. 76% of Mexicans over the age of 18 believe that the city they lived in in 2018 was unsafe[1]. The judiciary lack of power and the non-respect of rule of law result in almost systematic impunity. In Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela and Mexico, the level of impunity for murders exceeds 90% (Garzón, 2016).


In Colombia, peace agreements signed in 2016 between the Colombian government and the FARC and enshrined in the Constitution have not been respected by the government of Iván Duque, the president who succeeded Juan Manuel Santos, author and signatory of these agreements. Many former guerrillas took up arms again. Violence and drug trafficking often come with the complicity of the State. In Mexico, the two previous governments of López Obrador caused 234,000 deaths.


When it comes to drug trafficking, especially cocaine, as it moves away from its production country, it increases in value. According to the United Nations, a kilogram of cocaine produced in Bolivia costs $1,600 there, $26,000 in the United States and nearly $46,000 in Spain. The sums of money generated by its sale increase the risk that drug traffickers will infiltrate the state and corrupt its institutions. In countries such as Colombia or Mexico, cartels seek to create alliances with government authorities to obtain certain concessions such as the relaxed border controls.


To conclude, right-wing governments have not been able to cope with the economic situation in which they found themselves after the economic boom and sometimes have aggravated the situation as it was the case for Argentina and fed the general feeling of discontent among the population. Similarly, governments have failed to address structural problems such as impunity or corruption that are deeply entrenched in Latin American systems.

 

Indeed, these failures have generated significant inequalities over the last ten years and the exhaustion of Latin American societies. First of all, the social structure of Latin America remains pyramidal and sexist.

 


ECLAC latin america changes in per capita income strata

Credit: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Social Panorama of Latin America 2019. ECLAC 2019. https://www.cepal.org/es/publicaciones/44969-panorama-social-america-latina-2019.


On the one hand, this graph[2] above shows that the middle and upper classes have developed at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The growth of the middle class was most significant, especially between 2002 and 2008, coinciding with the commodity super cycle and the implementation of social programs. The development of the middle class can be explained by the improvement in purchasing power, which is in turn associated with the increase in credit. However, according to the Confederation of Commerce of Rio de Janeiro, part of the middle class was having a hard time paying off the debts created by the loans.


On the other hand, between 2008 and 2017, the number of extremely poor people rose (+14 million people). The social structure of Latin America continues to be pyramidal. ECLAC figures in 2017 show that 76.8% of Latin America's population is made up of people belonging to the working or lower middle classes.


Poverty affects indigenous peoples even more. In Mexico, about 50% of indigenous people aged 25 to 64 are employed in low-skilled jobs such as agriculture and handicrafts jobs.


Similarly, the Latin America job market is characterized by large informality. The informal job market is mainly composed of lower middle class and working-class workers. In 2021, the International Labor Organization (ILO) revealed that 70% of workers in Latin America have an informal job[3]. The Covid-19 pandemic starting in 2020 exacerbated socio-economic inequalities between those who could work because they had a formal job and informal workers.


The absence of State intervention prevents the middle class from accessing social security and unemployment benefits. According to the Development Bank of Latin America, in 2021, more than a third of Latin Americans (or 240 million people) have no access to social security services.[4] Unlike the working class, who is usually covered by social programs, the informal middle class does not benefit from social security. According to OECD figures, 95% of Bolivians are part of the middle class but do not contribute to the social security system. Indigenous populations have even less access to social security services. In Mexico, 78% of indigenous people do not have access to social security.[5] Access to social services for LGBTIQ+ people is very limited. Between 44% and 70% of transgender women have been forced to leave their homes.

 

Regarding education, although the enrolment rate in elementary school has increased from 23% to 52% in Latin America and the Caribbean[6], the out-of-school rate remains at 17%.[7] This hinders the process of social mobility. In Paraguay and Honduras, 32% of indigenous people are illiterate.

 

In addition, gender-based violence is on the rise in Latin America. According to the latest data from the Observatory for Gender Equality in Latin America and the Caribbean, in 2021, at least 4,473 women were victims of femicide in the region. That's at least 12 women killed every day for being a woman. Girls and adolescent girls are more at risk than any other social group to specific forms of violence, such as sexual violence and forced marriage (UNICEF, 2021). More than 4% of the total number of crimes involved girls under the age of 14.[8]

 

Although the situation seemed to be improving, the end of the commodity super cycle and of redistributive policies as well as state intervention in the economy caused countries' socio-economic indicators to fall. The middle class is the social class that suffers the most from budget cuts. All this has led many countries in the region to social crises from 2018 onwards.


  Indeed, between 2018 and 2022, most Latin American countries experienced strong social crises that were violently repressed by right-wing governments. The various points mentioned above have led to what is known as "el estallido social" in several Latin American countries. This term refers to a general weariness that has resulted in social protests. All these protests did not necessarily have the same origins, nor the same demands despite the fact that they happened at the same time.


Among the countries concerned are Ecuador and Chile whose protests began in 2019. In addition, in 2020, protests began in Peru. In March 2021, protests took place in Paraguay and then in Colombia in May of the same year.


The protests, mainly led by young people, were particularly violent, mainly due to police repression by right-wing governments. Many human rights organizations said that the use of force and weapons was not justified during protests, particularly in Chile, Ecuador and Colombia, as many protests took place peacefully.


Let's take one of the most striking examples: Chile. The social crisis began when the right-wing government of Sebastián Piñera decided to increase the price of the metro ticket in the capital in October 2019. To protest, high school students jumped over the barriers that are used to validate the metro ticket. As time went by, the protests have turned to other demands such as reforms for the pension system and in health and education. Faced with intensifying demonstrations, Piñera launched a repression that resulted in an increase in the number of police officers, the arrest of minors, the implementation of a state of emergency and a curfew. According to the National Institute of Human Rights of the Republic of Chile, 4,271 people were arrested, there were 120 complaints of torture and 34 people were killed during the October 2019 protests. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has therefore condemned the "excessive use of force".


Most of the protests and repression of right-wing governments have led to the abandonment of reforms and/or a change in the election ballots, as in some countries presidential elections have followed the protests. It is in this context that we talk about a new turn to the left, because in many countries the social crisis has led to the election of left-wing leaders.


It was then that a new left came to power in Latin American countries. These are mainly governments that are described as "progressive" because of their promises to reduce socio-economic inequalities, as was the case with the left in the 2000s. But for many of them, they also had a program in favor of democracy, feminism and the protection of environment, particularly in Argentina, Chile and Colombia, in order to respond to the new demands of society. These are thus less polarized governments than the left-wing governments of the first pink tide. New personalities have emerged such as Fernández in Argentina, Petro in Colombia or Boric in Chile, the youngest president in Chile's history. This is a whole new political cycle.


Thus, the deterioration of socio-economic factors and the flaws of Latin American systems have pushed people to protest for their rights. Here again, right-wing governments have not been able to cope with the situation and have often preferred to respond with violent repression. The discontent of citizens has been reflected in the results of the presidential elections.

 

CONCLUSION

South America's Political Orientation
Copyright Latam Sin Filtro

To conclude, the inability of right-wing states to respond to the structural problems of their countries and the deterioration of socio-economic indicators fueled by the pandemic have led to a general weariness of the population and a political shift to the left in many countries, as we can see in the map below:


However, these are very different lefts. In Peru, Pedro Castillo's left is anti-gender issues (unlike Argentina for example) while in Colombia, Gustavo Petro spoke, in his inaugural speech, of a Colombia of peace, love and a more inclusive government. The latter has also elected an African American vice-president, something unprecedented in the country.

 

"We will respect the [2016] Peace Agreement, we will strictly follow the recommendations of the Truth Commission's report, and we will work tirelessly to ensure peace and tranquility in Colombia. It is the government of life, of peace, and that is how it will be remembered." 

-Gustavo Petro, inaugural address, August 2022.


In addition, unlike the left-wing governments of the 2000s, those current governments are not benefiting from a commodity super cycle or an expansion of international trade.

Some left-wing governments already seem to be showing their flaws. For example, in Chile, after the demonstrations, a referendum was held in which the population voted in favor of drafting a new Constitution. However, on September 4, 2022, the new Constitution which provided for the establishment of new social rights was overwhelmingly rejected by the population (62%) because of its plurinational nature. Similarly, Pedro Castillo, president of Peru until December 7, 2022, tried to prevent his impeachment by dissolving Congress. His decision plunged the country into a deep political crisis and the Peruvian Parliament approved a motion of censure to expel him from office, accusing him of a coup attempt. Vice President Dina Boluarte took power after Castillo's ouster and became Peru's first female president.


In the end, these changes did not necessarily occur in favor of the left, but especially against the incumbent right-wing governments unable to respond to the demands of the population. Can we really talk about a shift to the left when in some countries such as Brazil or Colombia, the left narrowly won the elections? Indeed, some governments are aware of the political polarization that exists in their countries. Gustavo Petro has set himself the goal of bringing citizens together under one Colombia.


"We will unite, together, our beloved Colombia. We must end the division of our people. I don't want two countries, just as I don't want two societies.

I want a strong, just and united Colombia."

-Gustavo Petro, inaugural address, August 2022.



[1] "Why did López Obrador win in Mexico? - El Cronista", accessed on 11 November 2022  https://www.cronista.com/ripe/Por-que-gano-Lopez-Obrador-en-Mexico-20180703-0022.html.

[2] « La classe moyenne s'est développée en Amérique latine, mais il y a des risques en vue • Semanario Universidad », 11 décembre 2019,  https://semanariouniversidad.com/internacionales/crecio-la-clase-media-en-america-latina-pero-hay-riesgos-a-la-vista/.

[3] Roxana Maurizio, "Employment and Informality in Latin America and the Caribbean: An Insufficient and Uneven Recovery," n.d., p. 54.

[4] « La nouvelle (et dure) réalité des classes moyennes latino-américaines », consulted le 24 novembre 2022  https://www.caf.com/es/actualidad/noticias/2021/06/la-nueva-y-dura-realidad-de-las-clases-medias-latinoamericanas/.

[5] « Inequality of Opportunity for Indigenous and Afro-descendant Peoples | Publications," accessed November 29, 2022  https://publications.iadb.org/publications/spanish/document/Desigualdad-de-oportunidades-para-los-pueblos-indigenas-y-afrodescendientes.pdf.

[6] "Access to higher education for the poorest is a challenge in Latin America and the Caribbean – UNESCO-IESALC", accessed on 11 November 2022

[7] "Towards Universal Access to Higher Education: International Trends – UNESCO-IESALC," 2020, accessed November 11, 2022

[8] "Putting an end to violence against women and girls and femicide or femicide: a key issue for the construction of a society of care".


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