Colombia's "total peace"

The Colombian armed conflict reflects several structural problems in Colombian society. Land tenure and the lack of political representation of citizens are the two main reasons of the conflict that has plagued the country for more than 60 years. Colombia is characterized by very high social inequalities. On the one hand, there is the land-owning political elite[1] who have significant power. On the other hand, we have minority groups (indigenous, Afro-descendants, peasants) who do not have the same access to public services, land ownership rights and who lack political representation. This lack of political representation is illustrated by the existence, for many years, of only two political parties, the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party. In 1956, the Benidorm Pact was signed between the two parties to establish a system of political alternation between liberals and conservatives. This lack of political representation, coupled with the socio-economic exclusion of minority groups, has led to the emergence of leftist revolutionary movements and guerrilla groups and paramilitary groups representing the far right. Each guerrilla group represents an ideology that reflects all the ideas and facets of the Colombian left.

Over time, other factors have transformed and intensified the conflict. We all think of drug trafficking when it comes to the Colombian conflict, but other external factors have changed the nature of the conflict. For instance, the Second World War, the Cold War or the war on terrorism have transformed the form of the conflict in Colombia.

The Colombian armed conflict is a bloody war. According to the Truth Commission ("Comisión de la Verdad"), between 1985 and 2019, 450,664 people lost their lives due to the conflict. Paramilitary groups are responsible for 45% of the deaths and guerrilla groups for 27% of the killings.[2] 

Since the beginning of his presidential term on August 7, 2022, Colombian President Gustavo Petro has shown his willingness to achieve what he calls "total peace." On the day of his victory, he announced that he would launch a project with the aim of ending violence in Colombia through negotiations with the various armed groups that exist in the country. These are guerrilla groups such as the National Liberation Army (ELN) or the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). "Total peace" includes bringing these paramilitary groups and criminal gangs operating in the country to justice.

A few months after coming to power, on October 26, 2022, Congress approved President Petro's law, authorizing him to enter negotiations with paramilitary groups and drug traffickers linked to the conflict. On November 4, 2022, Petro's Law became Law 2272 of 2022 but to what extent does the dialogue-based Total Peace Law create even more tension and violence in Colombia?

The continuation of the Colón Theatre Agreement

Havana Negotiations: Establishing a Solid Foundation for Peace

The Colombian state had hoped to open peace negotiations with the Revolutionary Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP) in 1984 and 1998, but in vain. Since 2012, Colombian governments have been trying to advance peace talks with the FARC-EP, hoping to reach an agreement that will end the armed conflict and restore peace in the country. In 2016, the government of Juan Manuel Santos reached an agreement that represents the most significant step towards national reconciliation in the country's history. This agreement is the Teatro Colón Agreement (officially "Agreement for the End of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace") signed in Havana, Cuba. The negotiations were conducted with the presence of international guarantors[3] such as Cuba, Norway and Venezuela. The first to sign the agreement were Humberto de la Calle, head of the government's negotiating team, and the FARC's negotiator, Iván Márquez. This agreement is now enshrined in the Colombian Constitution, so its implementation is mandatory.

This agreement includes the demobilization with possible participation in the political life of the FARC, the surrender of arms to the UN and the reincorporation into civilian life of the oldest paramilitary group on the continent. Thanks to this agreement, the group is now represented by the political party of the Communities.[4] The former armed group began entering politics with ten seats in the Senate and House of Representatives until 2026. The regions most affected by the armed conflict have also benefited from political representation and participation. 16 seats have been created in the House of Representatives for those representing victims living in the territories affected by this situation. Similarly, the Colón Theater Agreement has allowed the demobilization of more than 13,000 ex-combatants who have received economic and psychosocial assistance, according to information from the Colombian government.[5] 

Finally, the agreement provides for the substitution of crops used for drug trafficking, an agrarian reform for a better distribution of land and the establishment of a special justice system. This led to the implementation of the Global System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition ("Sistema Integral de Verdad, Justicia, Reparación y no Repetición"). This system represents a set of mechanisms aimed at guaranteeing the rights of victims to truth, justice and reparation. The system contributes to the non-repetition of the conflict. It was incorporated into the Political Constitution of Colombia in 2017. It provides for the creation of various key bodies:

First of all, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, the JEP ("Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz") was created to judge crimes committed during the armed conflict and to satisfy the rights of victims by offering them truth and reparation. Secondly, the Commission for Truth, Coexistence and Non-Repetition (“Comisión de la Verdad, la Convivencia y la No Repetición”, CEV) is an entity that seeks to "clarify the mechanisms and explanatory causes of the national armed conflict that satisfies the right of the victims and society to the truth"[6] and contributes to laying the foundations for a lasting peace. Finally, the Unit for the Search for Missing Persons (« Unidad de Búsqueda de Personas dadas por Desaparecidas »,UBPD) is a humanitarian and extrajudicial entity dedicated to searching for people missing because of the conflict.

If such an agreement could be reached it was mainly because at that time the FARC-EP was experiencing numerous political and military coups and was therefore more conducive to negotiate with the Colombian state.

To sum up, the Colon Theatre Agreement establishes a bilateral and definitive ceasefire, the creation of temporary camps for FARC members, the disarmament of the forces and the creation of a group to monitor and supervise compliance with the agreement. Its implementation is mandatory because it is enshrined in the Colombian constitution. However, under the government of Iván Duque (2018-2022), the Havana Agreement was set aside by the president despite the obligation to implement it. The non-compliance with the agreement angered some senior FARC-EP commanders who decided to create a new structure known today as the "FARC dissidents".

Petro’s "policy of love"

Unlike his predecessor, Gustavo Petro, since coming to power, has aimed to achieve peace through dialogue. Indeed, in his victory speech, Petro talks about his "policy of love". The policy of love is an approach based on understanding, dialogue, representing the government of hope and its constituents, which he calls "the force of change, the force of love."

The Colombian president's goal is to restore peace in the country through negotiations with all the armed groups involved in a conflict that began 60 years ago and has left thousands of victims. In addition, the aim is to condemn criminal gangs, such as drug traffickers, for their illegal acts and human rights abuses. Left-wing "guerrillas" who have a real political role and other groups without political demands are targeted by the Petro law. The latter provides for the participation of conflict-affected communities in negotiations and promotes a model of peaceful coexistence to ensure the protection of civilians.

The law allows representatives of the Petro government to conduct negotiations and dialogues with illegal armed groups. Gang leaders and members can obtain benefits such as reduced sentences, the guarantee of non-extradition to the United States if they provide relevant information to the government such as drug trafficking routes, illegal products that are sold, or if they provide reparation to their victims, among others. These advantages will, in theory, make it possible to establish the terms of negotiation with members of criminal groups. Through these talks, a solution to the armed conflict must be found, human rights must be respected, and the members of these organizations must be reintegrated into society. When the members of the groups agree to the government's conditions, the arrest warrants issued against them are suspended. In September 2022, Colombia's Peace Commission announced that 10 criminal groups had agreed to the ceasefire provided for by law.[7] Among them we find the Central General Staff (EMC), the Second Marquetalia (dissidents of the FARC), the Clan del Golfo (the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia), the Self-Defense Forces of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta.

The "Total Peace" law includes many measures with different goals: condemning criminal acts, ensuring the protection of civilians and promoting social equality in Colombia. To achieve these objectives, the law promotes literacy, a national agrarian reform, environmental protection policies, care for vulnerable people, promotion of culture, among other measures. The law also provides for the replacement of compulsory military service with a "social service for peace" during which the youth must promote digital literacy in different regions of the country, support victims of the armed conflict and work for the protection of biodiversity.

To implement this project, the Petro administration has dedicated part of the national budget to the achievement of total peace. Regional and local governments also have a part of their budget for the implementation of the policy. This represents a significant social investment in regions and areas that have been affected by violence and criminal activities and where the population does not have access to basic services. These are generally marginalized regions. Finally, the law provides for the creation of "peace regions" in order to dialogue with the actors of illegal groups who wish to cooperate.

In summary, Petro's initiative must, on the one hand, respect the constitutional obligation to implement the commitments made with the 2016 Peace Agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC. On the other hand, it is aimed at negotiating with the ELN and taking the armed groups to court. The total peace policy is based on the principle that the security of the Colombian population depends on the protection of the right to life, socio-economic well-being and the environment protection. The policy of total peace is a state policy, constituting the priority of the Colombian government, which makes it different from previous policies.

"[Total peace] is a concept that implies not only a simultaneous dialogue with illegal armed groups, but also, in a way, a rupture from the logic of peace processes that have been carried out so far in Colombia... which is understood as the dialogue between a government and an armed group at the negotiating table"

-        Colombian Senator Iván Cepeda, founder of Total Peace

The first attempts at negotiations with dissident groups took place in the 1980s without any real success. There were 4 attempts at formal negotiations with the FARC before the Teatro Colón agreement and each president managed the armed conflict in different ways. Gustavo Petro's predecessor, Iván Duque, encouraged the FARC to go after the leaders of criminal gangs and gangs. Juan Manuel Santos spent his term negotiating a peace agreement with the FARC.

Petro's policy is unprecedented in its methodology and principles. Petro's policy recognizes the multiplicity of actors in the armed conflict. The Total Peace Law identifies two types of illegal groups: political armed groups organized outside the law and organized criminal structures (drug traffickers). The former can benefit from political recognition. However, it is difficult to determine whether a group is political or not, criminal, both, or neither. Armed political structures are often involved in criminal activities and some criminal organizations claim to have political claims. The barrier that separates the criminal from the politician is extremely thin. In addition, by failing to recognize the political nature of a group that defines itself as such, it could resort to violence against the government or the population as a form of retaliation.

However, Petro innovated by transforming the policy of total peace into a real state policy, that is, all state institutions are involved in the process. Each ministry must set clear goals and implement programs within the framework of total peace. This translates into social, environmental and economic reforms. The Petro government has shown its intention to implement an agrarian reform that allows for the redistribution of land among vulnerable populations and the legalization of the ownership of others since, according to the Colombian Ministry of Agriculture, in 2022, more than 65% of the country's land has no title deed.[8] On October 8, 2022, the Colombian government signed an agreement with the Colombian Federation of Cattle Breeders (FEDEGAN) that will allow the purchase and sale of 3 million hectares of fertile land to be handed over to peasants, especially peasant, indigenous and black women. [9]

In addition, the Colombian president's total peace puts the emphasis on the Colombian people. The policy puts an emphasis on human security, well-being and prosperity of the population. Citizen participation plays a central role in total peace. For example, the law establishes "peace regions" which are the territories most affected by violence so that local actors can dialogue and seek solutions to humanitarian problems at the local scale. It also establishes "temporary location zones" for the disarmament of groups at an advanced stage of negotiations, where arrest warrants for members can be suspended.

Petro has taken a different approach from his predecessors. He says that in order to fight against violence in Colombia, it is necessary to change precisely the approach to the fight against drug trafficking. He believes that drug trafficking does not start in the fields where workers[10] grow coca leaves but where they are transformed into huge sums of money.

The implementation of total peace: an ambitious but unrealistic project

Love is blind: is total peace a lenient policy?

Petro's law has been criticized for different reasons and from all sides, whether it is political opposition or his own collaborators. First, the law has been criticized on several occasions for its lack of clarity, particularly in terms of its objectives and concrete strategies, making its implementation very difficult. There is no clear roadmap for the implementation of the policy. Many criticize and deplore the lack of clear objectives accompanied by concrete actions to achieve them. Total peace provides for agreements with all the criminal groups that exist, but it does not provide, for example, for a roadmap that clearly determines the steps to achieve such goal, that gives priority to certain groups that are more violent than others. It is difficult to know where to start or with whom, preventing the government from making real progress.

Gustavo Petro's total peace project is facing other critics. Indeed, the main goal of the policy is to reach an agreement with illegal dissident groups that systematically resort to violence. To respond to this violence, total peace proposes a strategy based on negotiations and discussions with gangs and drug traffickers. It offers great benefits to gang members who provide information and collaborate with the government.

For this reason, the right-wing political opposition, the Democratic Centre, deplores an "apology for crime and impunity"[11] because the law allows for a reduction in sentences and the lifting of arrest warrants for any criminal who provides information to the government. The project has been criticized for giving a "second chance" to a part of the FARC that rearmed under FARC dissidents after breaking the peace agreements signed under the government of President Juan Manuel Santos (2014-2018). The reopening of the negotiations promotes "the culture of retrieval" (“cultura del repechaje” in Spanish)[12] in the words of the former government’s chief negotiator in Havana, Humberto de la Calle, because the policy of total peace allows people who did not abide by the previous peace agreement to accept this new agreement for better benefits. Even prosecutor Francisco Barbota says that total peace is a law that pardons criminals. 

Total peace is based only on negotiations and discussions, not on military actions by the army to end the armed conflict. The Department of Defense is not included in this policy, although it cannot be denied that it plays a central role in the peace process. The actions of the Ministry of Defense are not aligned with total peace. According to a study conducted by the Ideas for Peace Foundation, in the first three months of the Petro government, the actions of the State forces against criminal groups decreased by 70%.[13]

A love policy that leaves room for even more hatred…

Meanwhile, clashes between illegal groups have increased by 79%. While the army is put aside, criminal groups can continue social violence without fearing repression from the Colombian National Army. The policy has given the National Liberation Army (ELN) time to decentralize, take control of several regions and forge alliances with other illegal groups. Petro's policy is based on gradual agreements, but this can lead to endless negotiations that allow criminal groups such as the ELN to reorganize and strengthen themselves instead of agreeing to lay down their weapons. These groups benefit from the policy that allows them to strengthen their regional presence and by joining forces with other groups to develop their operational capacity (armament capabilities, recruitment, etc.). They are also seeking have a stronger position in the negotiations to obtain better concessions in a possible discussion with the government.

Ultimately, the military's absence in Petro's policies appears to weaken the Colombian government facing gangs and paramilitary groups. In the context of the negotiations, the Colombian government is not able to negotiate because it is not exerting any pressure on the groups. In fact, the government offers them a lift of the arrest warrants and a reduction in their sentences if they agree to lay down their weapons. There is almost nothing interesting to negotiate with the illegal groups that continue to gain power, especially in rural areas that constitute real legal vacuums. Armed groups take advantage of the policy to carry out illegal activities in these areas, such as drug trafficking or illegal mining. In addition, the policy of total peace completely ignores certain types of actions carried out by guerrilla structures, such as recruitment and propaganda processes, social or sexual violence.

Similarly, Petro has failed to integrate the most important guerrilla groups, paramilitaries and gangs into his peace project. The ELN and the Gulf Clan[14] are no longer part of the ceasefire. The ELN claims it never signed it, while Petro ended the truce with the Gulf clan in March 2023 after discovering that the clan was involved in a miners' strike. Thus, since the implementation of the total peace policy, no agreement has been reached with any of the gangs or paramilitary and guerrilla groups.

Finally, total peace seems to neglect the implementation of the agreements reached with the FARC in 2016 in Havana and even the FARC is demanding that the negotiation points of the agreement be implemented and respected.

Conclusion

Gustavo Petro and his government have implemented an unprecedented policy to achieve peace in Colombia. The policy of total peace, centered on dialogue and the human nature of the conflict, seems to be the continuation of the agreement negotiated by Juan Manuel Santos, which was little respected by Iván Duque from 2018 onwards. However, Gustavo Petro's policy has several flaws. Dialogue, which is the only legitimate way to achieve peace, creates even more violence and does not place the Colombian state in a favorable position in the negotiations. Is it possible to choose between force and dialogue to achieve peace in Colombia? It is very difficult for a government to end a conflict that has plagued the country for more than 50 years and implement real changes in just 4 years (the length of the presidential term in Colombia) without the possibility of re-election. It is not possible to ensure that successors will follow the policy implemented by the current government, which significantly weakens the effective implementation of a policy against armed conflict. Moreover, in order to put an end to the Colombian conflict, it is first necessary to accept the existence of such a conflict. When it comes to the armed conflict in Colombia, the historical memory remains very fragile. For many years, representatives of the Colombian state did not speak of armed conflict. Under the presidency of Álvaro Uribe, for example, for the president, " there has not been such a phenomenon ". It was "widespread violence by illegal armed groups". The question of historical memory is essential to understand the extreme complexity of this conflict and to be able to move forward in the negotiations.

[1] "Latifundio, from the Latin latifundium, is a rustic estate of large dimensions. It is a large farm that generally does not use all of its resources efficiently. The person who has one or more latifundia is known as a latifundista. The latifundio is a typical Latin American concept. "Latifundio - Definicion.de", Definición.de, accessed 11 July 2023  https://definicion.de/latifundio/.

[2]"Figures of the Truth Commission presented together with the final report," accessed July 17, 2023,  https://web.comisiondelaverdad.co/actualidad/noticias/principales-cifras-comision-de-la-verdad-informe-final.

[3] Rights guarantors are entities or persons who have a special obligation or responsibility to respect, promote and guarantee the enjoyment of human rights, as well as to refrain from violating them. This term is often used to refer to state actors, although non-state actors can also be considered as guarantors of rights. Capacity Building for Managers | UNESCO," accessed June 14, 2023,  https://www.unesco.org/es/node/68043.

[4] « Actualités | Archives générales de la nation », consulted le 14 juin 2023  https://www.archivogeneral.gov.co/agn/noticia/el-acuerdo-de-paz-renace-con-el-gobierno-del-cambio.

[5] « Actualités | Archives générales de la nation », consulted le 14 juin 2023  https://www.archivogeneral.gov.co/agn/noticia/el-acuerdo-de-paz-renace-con-el-gobierno-del-cambio.

[6] "What is the Truth Commission?", Colombia Truth Commission, accessed 14 June 2023  https://web.comisiondelaverdad.co/la-comision/que-es-la-comision-de-la-verdad.

[7] Karen Sánchez, « En quoi consiste la politique de « paix totale » du président Gustavo Petro ? », Voice of America, 8 May 2023,  https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/en-que-consiste-politica-paz-total-gustavo-petro-/7079441.html.

[8] « Plus de 65 % des terres de la Colombie ne sont pas utilisées, a assuré le ministère de l'Agriculture », infobae, consulté le 5 juillet 2023  https://www.infobae.com/america/colombia/2022/09/28/mas-del-65-de-las-tierras-de-colombia-no-se-aprovecha-aseguro-el-ministerio-de-agricultura/.

[9] "Presidency of the Republic of Colombia," accessed July 5, 2023  https://petro.presidencia.gov.co/.

[10] RAE-ASALE and RAE, « peón, peona | Dictionary of the Spanish Language", "Dictionary of the Spanish Language" - Tercentenary Edition, accessed June 6, 2023  https://dle.rae.es/peón.

[11] Melissa Velásquez Loaiza, "What is the total peace proposed by Petro and which groups would be welcome?", CNN, October 27, 2022  https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2022/10/27/colombia-paz-total-petro-grupos-armados-ilegales-interes-orix/.

[12] "In football, the “repechaje” is given to a team to allow them to continue a competition." RAE-ASALE and RAE, « Draft | Dictionary of the Spanish Language", "Dictionary of the Spanish Language" - Tricentennial Edition, accessed June 27, 2023,  https://dle.rae.es/repechaje.

[13] Catalina Nino, "The Obstacles to 'Total Peace' in Colombia | New Society", New Society | Democracy and Politics in Latin America, June 6, 2023,  https://nuso.org/articulo/305-obstaculos-paz-total-colombia/.

[14] The Golfo Clan, formerly known as the Usuga Clan or Los Urabeños, the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia is a Colombian criminal gang dedicated to drug trafficking and extortion. Melissa Velásquez Loaiza, "What is the Clan del Golfo? History and leaders of the new generation of drug traffickers in Colombia", CNN, 10 May 2022,  https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2022/05/10/que-es-clan-del-golfo-historia-lideres-narcos-colombia-orix/.

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