4 years of Nayib Bukele in El Salvador

El Salvador is a small country in Central America of 21,040 km2 located between Honduras and Guatemala. If for a long time El Salvador was totally unknown and even ignored by a large part of the international community, today everyone has heard at least once the name of Nayib Bukele, the president of El Salvador, the charismatic "savior" who restored peace and security in the country through his "war against gangs" and the construction of a mega prison for gang members.

However, the rigidity of his practices has been criticized several times, and his success is quite controversial: during his first term, Bukele was accused by the opposition of having attempted "a coup d'état". Was it really like that? In the press, many call him "the cool dictator", however, is Bukele really a dictator?

In this essay, we are going to answer these questions by taking stock of Nayib Bukele's first presidential term using a critical approach and focusing on the security issue that was the main goal of his first term.

El Salvador and Nayib Bukele

Situation in El Salvador before Bukele's arrival to the presidency

Economic and political situation of El Salvador

Since its independence in 1821, El Salvador, like many other Latin American countries, has experienced a concentration of power and wealth in the hands of elites, causing deep inequalities. Several social movements and parties like the Communist Party had been demanding for structural changes and for a more equal society but in 1981 the civil war broke out in El Salvador. The different currents of the left united to create the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) and fought against the military dictatorship to obtain structural changes at the economic, political and social levels. In 1992, the Chapultepec accords were signed, ending the civil war. These agreements focused on the reintegration of armed groups into Salvadoran society, and the protection of human rights, leaving aside socioeconomic inequalities even though they were one of the main causes of the conflict.

After the war, El Salvador began to implement neoliberal policies (Washington Consensus) increasing the economic precariousness of citizens and the already existing inequalities. The Salvadoran market opened up and facing international competition without having competitive and productive national companies that could compete with foreign companies. The civil war that occurred just 44 years ago and ended 33 years ago left the country in a difficult socioeconomic situation, with a lot of poverty and inequalities. It was fertile ground for the increase in delinquency and crime. In the mid-1990s, the maras developed in the country and the high rates of crime in the country attracted very little foreign investment in the country. According to World Bank data, foreign direct investment (FDI) represented 0% of Salvadoran GDP in 2022.  In 2019, poverty represented 26.8% of the population and about 5% of the Salvadoran population lived in extreme poverty.[1] 

In the political sphere, since the 1980s El Salvador has had two traditional parties, ARENA and FMLN (it became a political party at the end of the civil war). Bukele came to the presidency in a context of general weariness of the population with these two parties. The FMLN had been in the presidency for 8 years without fulfilling its promises and ARENA had been facing several accusations of corruption.

Why has El Salvador registered for years extremely high rates of violence? The problem of the maras

Let’s first understand the nature of the conflict between the maras before analyzing Nayib Bukele's strategy. So, let's take a look at how and when the gangs were born and what the situation was like in the country before Nayib Bukele began his presidency.

Since the end of the civil war in 1992, El Salvador had been experiencing high levels of violence. However, this violence was not the result of a remobilization of the actors in the civil war but was rather due to the increase in crime, especially among young people who were part of the maras.

The increase in violence in El Salvador is closely linked to the phenomenon of economic migration from El Salvador to the United States that took place at the end of the Salvadoran civil war. Coming out of the war, El Salvador was in a difficult economic situation. As a result, many Salvadorans emigrated to the United States, particularly in Southern California, in working-class neighborhoods of the city of Los Angeles, which, like other large U.S. cities, registered high levels of crime.

We can highlight two Salvadoran maras: the Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS13) and its rival Barrio 18 (Eighteen Street Gang). Both gangs find their origins in the poorest Latino ghettos of Los Angeles, where Latino gangs considered "prestigious" and represented symbols of power for a large number of immigrant teenagers or children of immigrants. The Barrio 18 has existed since the 1940s and was originally mainly made up of Latin American immigrants and refugees. The MS13 emerged in the 1970s and was first made up of heavy metal fans. By the late 1980s, both maras were well positioned within the region's Latino gang system. The two gangs were part of the "southern system.” (“Sistema sureño”, in Spanish) This system brings together all the gangs in Southern California that fight each other for control of the territories, and control of their neighborhood. However, with President Reagan's (1981-1989) mass incarceration policies in the 1980s, many gang members were incarcerated. Inside the prisons, the different gangs of the South began to join forces to defend themselves against the Latino gangs of Northern California, the African American gangs and other enemy gangs.

The tensions between the Mara Salvatrucha and the Barrio 18 really began in 1989. They began to clash over control of territories, drug trafficking and the recruitment of new members. Notions of prestige and respect are essential to understanding gang confrontations. One of the reasons why the gangs confront each other in an almost ritualistic way is only to obtain prestige and be respected by the neighborhood. Gangs only exist to attack each other. It can almost be considered that, if one of the gangs falls, the other no longer has a reason to exist. In fact, violent relations between gangs have never been motivated by deep disagreements or different political views. Violence between the maras was primarily an ethnic conflict.

At the end of the civil war in 1992, a vast deportation process began, and the U.S. sent hundreds of gang members back to their home countries. When it comes to El Salvador, a large part came from the Mara Salvatrucha 13 or Barrio 18. Upon returning to their country, gang members continued their acts of violence, contributing to the drastic increase in crime and homicides in the country. They no longer needed to protect themselves from other U.S. gangs, but they continued to attack each other anyway and a feeling of revenge settled between the two gangs that wanted to keep their status and be respected by the neighborhood. Again, these criminal groups have no political claims. Their only goal is territorial control. They fight for the monopoly of violence.

2001-2019: Implementation of Mano Dura and Super Mano Dura policies against the gangs

Until 2001, the state had been ignoring the issue of gangs and minimizing the power of gangs, allowing them to control several neighborhoods of the country. Tough-on-crime policies better known as “Mano Dura” policies were introduced in 2001, recognizing that gangs represented a serious security problem and that repressive strategies against them needed to be developed. Those policies led to violent clashes between the State and gangs. At first, the gangs did not aim to confront the police forces, but from the 2000s onwards the State became an enemy. If prestige had been obtained by fighting against the enemy gang, it was then also obtained by attacking the State. However, it is not a direct conflict between the gangs and the State. The gangs still have no political demands or concrete plans against the State. They “only” defend themselves from the State that tries to prevent them from controlling territories in the country.

Several years of secret negotiations between the State and gangs led to the implementation of a truce between March 2012 and May 2013. However, this truce allowed the gangs to consolidate their bases and adapt to the blows dealt by the police and the army. The sudden interruption of the truce in 2013 intensified clashes between the State and the maras. In 2015, violence in El Salvador peaked, clashes between police and gang members increased exponentially. Faced with this situation, the Supreme Court of El Salvador declared the gangs as terrorist groups and declared negotiation with them illegal. The "Safe Salvador" (“El Plan Salvador Seguro”, in Spanish) plan was launched by President Salvador Sánchez Cerén (2014-2019). He announced the deployment of 600 elite soldiers, in addition to the 7,000 soldiers already deployed to patrol urban areas. These elite soldiers had no training to capture suspects; they were only trained to kill the enemy. Then the death toll skyrocketed, and the main gangs stopped attacking each other to concentrate their resistance against the State. In the end, neither the Mano Dura policies of the different governments nor the truce managed to reduce the high levels of violence. In 2016, insecurity and violence cost El Salvador more than 16% of its GDP.[2]

In addition, over time new actors became involved in the conflict, and today gang members are not the only ones responsible for the high levels of violence. On the one hand, paramilitary groups, self-defense militias and private security companies were created. The abandonment of certain territories by the security forces is the main reason for the emergence of such elimination and defense groups.

On the other hand, criminal gangs multiplied, and the two original gangs reorganized. MS-13 and Barrio 18 suffered splits. Within the MS-13 the MS-503 was born. Power struggles to appropriate economic resources led to this split. MS-503 advocated a return to an "exclusive armed struggle between gangs" and an abandonment of violence against the population and the State. The MS-503 denounced electoral pacts and declared that MS-13 should not interfere in political affairs. In response, senior MS-13 officials ordered the execution of all dissidents. The orders specified that dissidents' family members, parents, wives, partners and children were also targets. Likewise, Barrio-18 also experienced internal unrest. The traditional Barrio-18 Sureños gang opposes the B-18 Revolucionarios, which officially split in 2005. This division into two factions is linked to a dispute over the distribution of extortion resources. Finally, other gangs also emerged, such as the Mara R, a newcomer that further complicated the situation. There are also other gangs such as the Mirada Locos, the Mara Máquina and the Mao Mao, which represent about 17%[3] of the estimated number of gang members. The Mara R became a real actor in the conflict counting among its ranks former members of the MS-13 and B-18.

Impunity in the country: El Salvador's judicial and penitentiary system

For several years, El Salvador has demonstrated its inability to guarantee safety among its citizens. Facing the spread of violence, the country's judicial and penitentiary systems seem powerless. In addition, there is a lot of corruption within the police forces. The inhabitants of the areas controlled by the gang members cannot react or denounce their actions for fear of reprisals or even of coming face to face with a corrupt agent. They must follow the gang law: "see, hear, be silent." (“ver, oír, callar”).

The jail system in El Salvador has several flaws which do not allow for adequate punishment of the guilty nor the eradication of gangs. Prisons are the main place where the gangs are strengthened. Being in jail allows gang members to reorganize and "professionalize."[4] In prisons, gang members began to take an interest in drug trafficking as a means of financing violence. In 2018, approximately 40,000 Salvadorans were incarcerated, that is, 614 people per 100,000 inhabitants[5] and were distributed among 25 prisons. With Bukele’s "war on gangs," this figure reached 1,659 people per 100,000 inhabitants in 2024[6].

Policies that allow gang members to reintegrate into civilian life after incarceration are few and often ineffective. As for gang members who wish to repent, they distrust the judicial system and police forces because of the little protection they can offer them.

To conclude, since the 1990s El Salvador has suffered from high levels of violence that are explained by gang wars that since 2001 have also included the State. Until 2022, homicides were mainly due to clashes between security forces and gang members. According to World Bank figures, in 2021, there were 18 intentional homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. In addition, the judicial and prison systems were not up to the challenge that El Salvador had to face.

Who is Nayib Bukele?

Nayib Armando Bukele Ortez was born on July 24, 1981, in San Salvador. Nayib is the son of Armando Bukele Kattán (1944-2015), a Palestinian businessman and politician, doctor in Industrial Chemistry, physicist, historian, economist and journalist. At the age of 18, Nayib Bukele began to run family businesses and went to college to study Legal Sciences at the José Simeón Cañas Central American University (UCA El Salvador) with the goal of becoming a lawyer, but he never obtained that degree. Nayib preferred to dedicate himself to managing several family businesses. One of them was particularly successful: OBERMET, a promotional and advertising services company of which Nayib was president.

In 2011, at the age of 30, Nayib Bukele decided to start his political career within the FMLN party.  His career began with his arrival at the mayor's office of a small municipality of La Libertad that has less than 10,000 inhabitants, Nuevo Cuscatlán, between May 1, 2012, and April 30, 2015. Despite the lack of political relevance of this municipality, Nayib Bukele managed to make himself known in the country's capital as a new figure of the Salvadoran left by connecting with youth through social networks. He became known as an innovative and dynamic politician, which allowed him to reach the mayor's office of the capital, San Salvador, in 2015. During his administration, Bukele implemented several programs to develop San Salvador's infrastructure. Among them we can highlight its initiative "One work per day" that meant, among other things, the construction of new roads and houses, as well as the reconstruction of deteriorated areas. In addition, he carried out the restoration of the historic center of the capital.

If all these projects were well received by citizens, they were not by the FMLN, which accused Bukele of being a populist. Well, several times Bukele had denounced the corruption, dishonesty and hidden interests of the party and the Salvadoran government in general. He denounced a lack of representation of citizens and their demands by politicians, which led to him being expelled from the party in October 2017 by the FMLN's Ethics Tribunal.

At the same time, Bukele announced the formation of his own political party Nuevas Ideas with the aim of reaching the Presidency of the Republic of El Salvador. In three months, the party collected 200,000 signatures, that is, four times more signatures than the Law requires to form a new political party (50,000 signatures are needed). However, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal delayed registering Nuevas Ideas as a legal political party, which did not allow Nayib Bukele to run as a candidate for the 2019 presidential elections with his party. With this, Bukele decided to run for office with the Grand National Alliance (GANA), a center-right party. He did not feel uncomfortable with the fact of running with a conservative party since the politician always refused to define himself as a left-wing or right-wing politician.

His youthful, "anti-system" image and his rather populist[7] "anti-corruption" speech proved effective and allowed him to win the presidential elections. On February 3, 2019, with a landslide victory, he won the presidential elections, becoming the youngest president in the country's history and the youngest in all Latin America at 38. In addition, Bukele became the first Salvadoran president to reach the presidency without belonging to ARENA or FMLN, that is, the two traditional parties that faced each other during the Civil War. Bukele believes in God, although he has declared that he belongs to no religion. The figure of God is recurrent in his speeches.

As a conclusion, it is hard to determine Nayib Bukele's political ideology. If he has shown on social media his approval of right-wing politicians such as Donald Trump in the United States or Javier Milei in Argentina, he also has published posts about Daniel Ortega's Nicaragua but denounced the result of the 2024 presidential elections in X, stating that they were a "fraud" and mocked Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro on Instagram. What is clear is that Bukele came to the presidency of El Salvador to attack traditional political parties and redefine the country's politics.

Assessment of Nayib Bukele's first term

When Bukele came to power, El Salvador was exhausted from illegal trafficking and gang wars, the government was plagued by corruption and totally discredited, and the judicial system was flawed and rather powerless. In addition, inequalities and poverty increased in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis. Since 2000, the economy has grown timidly. Is El Salvador different now in 2025?

Successes and failures of President Bukele's agenda

The "war against gangs": victory for the government?

Just like his predecessors, upon becoming president, Nayib Bukele implemented mano dura policies to fight the gangs and continued the Territorial Control Plan that had been launched on June 20, 2019, to end with maras. This plan has seven phases of which six have already been implemented.

1. Phase One, "Preparation": regaining control of territories and implementing repression Against the maras.

2. Phase two, "Opportunities": generating better living conditions for young people and preventing violence.

3. Phase three, "Modernization of the Government's security forces": strengthening the operational capacity of the security forces through investments in the updating of equipment and technological resources.

4. Phase four, "Raid": it started on July 19, 2021. This stage involves the direct intervention of the security forces in territories that were previously difficult to access due to the presence of gangs. During this fourth phase, President Nayib Bukele announced the incorporation of 1,046 new soldiers from the Armed Forces in support of the National Civil Police (PNC).

5. Phase five, "Extraction": on November 23, 2022, President Nayib Bukele announced the start of this phase that launched an intervention by the armed forces with the aim of neutralizing gangs throughout Salvadoran territory. Within the framework of this fifth phase the Terrorism Confinement Center (CECOT), better known as El Salvador's famous “mega jail” was built, with a capacity to incarcerate 40,000 criminals. It is the largest prison of the American continent. This prison aims to incarcerate criminals arrested during this phase and avoid overcrowding the country's prisons. The population supported Bukele’s decision to build this mega jail. If in the early 2000s going to jail allowed gangs to reorganize and develop their drug trafficking activities, this mega prison seems to be different. Prisoners are likely to never leave it, they can never leave their cell, and they cannot speak without being authorized.

6. Phase six, "Integration": it was announced on September 15, 2023, by Nayib Bukele, who specified that its implementation would benefit from a budget of 30 million dollars per year. It involves the implementation of several social programs like the delivery of 2,000 student scholarships or paid internships for people over 60 years of age.

The night of March 26, 2022, was the bloodiest (in terms of homicides) since 1992. 62 people were killed by gang members. Many claim that the violence that night is the response of the gangs to the attitude of Bukele, who would have refused to release one of the high-ranking members of the gangs during negotiations between the president and the gangs.

Faced with the situation, Bukele implemented the State of Exception in the country for 30 days. Such a measure involves the restriction of several rights for individuals. The State of Emergency suspends the right of assembly and association, the right to be accompanied by a lawyer and to be informed of the reasons for detention. In addition, it suspends the right to privacy of communication and the right to be released after 72 hours in police custody without having seen a judge, extending this period to 15 days. A few months after the implementation of the State of Exception, the president announced the launch of the fifth phase of the Territorial Control Plan, the "Extraction" phase.

Likewise, the State of Exception meant the use of 80 million dollars to equip the armed forces and deploy the Army, as well as the Police. Police and armed forces patrol dangerous neighborhoods, filter entrances and exits at dusk and go door-to-door to interrogate civilians and arrest anyone suspected of belonging to a gang. Bukele also has pressured detainees by rationing their meals, cutting off their visitation rights, and removing all basic amenities from their cells: no more mattresses or hygiene kits.

In addition, the National Assembly enacted a revision of the Penal Code that doubles or even triples prison sentences for crimes and offenses committed by a gang member and punishes being the leader of a gang with 40 to 45 years in prison. Collaboration with a gang is punishable by 20 to 30 years in prison (compared to 3 to 6 years before the State of Emergency). Finally, during trials, judges are "anonymous": their name and personal details are kept secret throughout the process. Witnesses are no longer required to appear in court and indirect witnesses, i.e. those who were informed of facts without having seen them directly, have now value.

The State of Emergency was supposed to last only 30 days, but Bukele never lifted it. After two months, more than 30,560 people were arrested with waves of 1,000 to 1,400 people arrested in 24 hours.[8] Bukele's strategy allowed the country to go 6 consecutive days without any homicide being reported. In general, the population supported Bukele's policy, feeling safer and more protected with police patrols in the towns. Progressively, people were able to go out again, see friends or just take walk in the park.

Bukele's strategy had quite exceptional and very positive results in the short run. According to the government of El Salvador[9], the Territorial Control Plan and the State of Emergency allowed to save more than $60 million in Health with the reduction of people injured by firearms. The government states that each person injured by a firearm represents a cost of an average of $32,000. In addition, the head of the Ministry of Housing (MIVI), Michelle Sol, said that at least 4,500 homes that were in the hands of the gangs could be returned to the population.[10] According to data from the Ministry of Justice and National Security and the National Civil Police, in 2023, El Salvador reached the lowest homicide rate in its history (154 homicides in 2023 against 495 homicides in 2022[11]). Finally, the homicide rate per 100 thousand inhabitants went from 18 in 2021 to 2.4 in 2023.

When it comes to security, Nayib Bukele fulfilled his promises without any doubt and obtained direct results that positively affected the country's economy and the population's confidence in the current government.

Socio-economic results

Bukele’s policy and his control of the maras had a positive impact on the country’s economy. On the one hand, numerous improvements can be highlighted:

According to UN data, El Salvador has established itself as an attractive destination for FDI. As seen above, foreign investment has been almost non-existent in El Salvador. However, in 2023, the country attracted $730 million in FDI, representing a 344% increase from 2022.

In 2023, El Salvador was the fourth country in the region with the highest growth in tourist arrivals, increasing by 40.4% compared to 2019. These data underscore El Salvador’s touristic potential. The government must invest in this sector to promote it.

The business climate in El Salvador became favorable thanks to controlled inflation and solid economic growth. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) in November 2024 was 129.93, it is still high, but it also shows a monthly variation of -0.09% and an annual variation of -0.31%, demonstrating a drop in inflation in the country (2.41 percentage points lower than that recorded a year ago).[12] Government revenues increased by 6.8% in 2023. Economic projections for the country forecast above-average growth for the region with a drop in inflation. In addition, El Salvador has a high population density and a young workforce: 54% of its workforce is under 40 years of age.

On the other hand, other policies had limited results. On September 7, 2021, the Bitcoin Law was implemented allowing Bitcoin to be adopted as legal currency in El Salvador. The use of bitcoin as a currency had several goals such as better financial inclusion, gains for public finances and a reduction of remittance costs. However, the implementation of this policy was extremely difficult, and the results were not as good as expected. The population was reluctant to use this crypto currency due to the traditional preference for cash. It also caused a lack of confidence from international investors.

Despite economic growth and an increase in tourism, many challenges remain to be met: the country's public deficit remains significant. According to the World Bank[13], the fiscal deficit reached 4.7% of GDP in 2023 and public debt peaked at 84.9% of GDP. The quality of the country's institutions has worsened since 2016 and they remain at levels below the regional average.

In terms of reducing poverty and inequalities, despite the social programs implemented during his first term, President Bukele still has to face several challenges: according to the World Bank report "Improving Lives and Livelihoods: Assessing Poverty and Equity in El Salvador 2024"[14], in 2023, the country had 600,000 people living below the extreme poverty line (9.3% of the population), whose income does not cover the cost of a basic consumption basket (USD 1.5 per person per day in rural areas and USD 2.3 in urban areas). In addition, the incomes of the poorest have declined since 2019. Formal jobs and access to education as a source of social mobility are essential to reduce monetary poverty and reduce socioeconomic inequalities.

To conclude, the economic results of Bukele were quite good, although there is still progress to be made in terms of equality or socio-economic equity.

Limits of mano dura policies

If the results of Bukele's policy were exceptional in the short term, the country is also facing structural problems such as a weak and imperfect judicial system that needs to be reformed. However, it seems that Bukele did not even try to reform it which would limit the results of his strategy in the long run.

First, several gang leaders disappeared and were not arrested, which could let us think that there were negotiations between the government and the maras. We'll probably have the answer to that question in a few years.

Second, the Bukele method was criticized by many human rights NGOs and its effectiveness was questioned by various experts, researchers, and college students. In fact, many report errors regarding detainees and signal that people were arrested without evidence or substantiation. Indeed, the State of Emergency allows the police to arrest someone without investigating. Several people were arrested just for having tattoos. Without having to investigate it is obviously very easy to arrest people. At the end of 2024, the Nayib Bukele recognized the imperfections and errors of his mano dura policy in imprisoning innocent people but decided to go on with it no matter what, emphasizing that it was necessary to end with the maras.

In addition, the CECOT does not have a resocializing function and does not allow the reintegration of gang members into society. Relatives of prisoners have no information about them and do not have the right to visit them. The CECOT also means that the government will have to bear significant expenses to keep prisoners in this mega-prison, pay staff and keep security systems in good condition.

In the long run, Bukele's strategy could prove ineffective. His policy is a continuation of the mano dura policies that have been applied for years in El Salvador that do not address the structural problems of the judicial and prison systems mentioned earlier in this essay. The country's already deficient judicial system must cope with this overcrowding of arrests and trials. It lacks financial and personnel resources to deal with this situation. It's hard to build strong cases against gang members. Although it is very easy to arrest, it is more difficult to imprison. Sometimes, due to lack of evidence, many innocent people serve long sentences in pre-trial detention. On the other hand, due to the lack of incriminating evidence, many culprits are released at the end of their period of pre-trial detention. Impunity and injustice still represent a challenge for the government.

Has El Salvador really become a dictatorship? Nayib Bukele, the "cool dictator"

No matter how popular Nayib Bukele is and how effective his policies are, the authoritarian nature of some of his practices cannot be denied.

In a democracy, the separation and independence of powers are key. They are at the heart of democratic governance. However, during his first term, Bukele managed to concentrate the three powers of the State (executive, legislative and judicial) with strategies whose constitutionality was questioned several times...

The president had attitudes that lead us to question his willingness to respect democracy and institutions. For instance, in February 2020 the president faced his first major political crisis just one year into his government. Bukele confronted the Legislative Assembly, storming Congress and interrupting its activities by sitting in the chair of the parliamentary president accompanied by police and military officers, due to the fact that the deputies of the opposition- ARENA and the FMLN- refused to approve a loan of 109 million dollars to finance the fifth phase of the Territorial Control Plan.

Faced with the situation, the president called for a popular insurrection but failed to obtain legislative approval. He then began a campaign to obtain a majority in the legislative elections and be able to have the budget voted. He obtained it in a totally democratic way with more than 50% of the parliament’s seats.

Two months after those elections, deputies decided to dismiss the judges of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court. If this decision was first declared unconstitutional, in the end Nayib Bukele managed to concentrate the three powers of the State. From this moment on, we can describe Bukele's presidency as a "hyper presidency" since the president not only has control of the executive branch but of the two other powers that exist in a democracy.

On the one hand, Bukele's strategy and the State of Exception, above all, raise many questions about the independence of the judiciary in El Salvador. According to Benjamin Moallic[15], El Salvador's rule of law[16] is in danger. According to him, it can be questioned whether it is legitimate to punish with sentences of 10 to 15 years in jail all advertising for the gangs when incitement to genocide is “only” punishable from 4 to 8 years and acts of rape from 6 to 10 years in prison.

The enforcement and upholding of the State of Emergency summed with the ineffective judicial system, could also lead the government to uphold endlessly of all the above-mentioned practices regarding detention of people or trials, completely undermining the country's already fragile system and feed into impunity and injustice.

Likewise, many experts question and criticize the 2015 law that classifies the gangs as "terrorist groups". Nevertheless, there is no universal definition of terrorism, which means that each country can define this term as it wants, there are more than a hundred different definitions. It is thus difficult to say if maras members are really terrorists. Each country can deal with them as they are pleased to do.

In addition, experts consider that the CECOT does not respond to the resocialization needs of gang members and dehumanizes them without considering the fact that not everybody chooses to enter a gang. Many of the gang members were recruited as teenagers and often had no choice but to join the maras. However, it is very likely that the prisoners will never be free again since many must serve a sentence of 200 years or more. Many argue that this center is not a sustainable solution that responds to the socioeconomic problems of El Salvador and that it does not respect Human Rights, although El Salvador has signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the UN.

On the other hand, the State of Exception does not seem to be compatible with Salvadoran democracy. Renewing the State of Emergency allowed Nayib Bukele to be re-elected even though the Salvadoran Constitution does not allow re-election. The State of Exception gives the president additional powers and enables him to circumvent the law. The centralization of legislative and judicial powers made it possible for him to legitimize his candidacy for a second term. The new Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, whose magistrates were chosen by the president himself, declared a judicial ruling on the Article 152 of El Salvador's Magna Carta preventing reelection. That way, Bukele was able to apply for re-election. One of the risks is that Nayib Bukele's presidency will never end and that the terms of the Constitution will not be respected. Bukele could use the Supreme Court to change the Constitution and allow him to run for presidency indefinitely.

Regarding freedom of expression and journalism, in 2022, an Assembly law prohibited all promotion of maras and punishes with sentences of 10 to 15 years in prison not only anyone guilty of elaborating or participating in the elaboration of implicitly or explicitly pro-Mara messages, but also any radio media, television, written or digital that reproduces or transmits messages or communications that, coming from or allegedly attributed to these criminal groups, may generate anxiety and panic among the population.

Here is an excerpt from decree number 1030 of the Legislative Assembly of April 5, 2022 that reforms the penal code:

"ILLEGAL ELABORATION AND REPRODUCTION OF MESSAGES, SIGNS, DENOMINATIONS OR ADVERTISEMENTS ALLUDING TO MARAS OR GANGS

  Art. 345-C.- Anyone who elaborates, participates in its preparation, facilitates or manufactures, texts, paintings, designs, drawings, graffiti or any form of visual expression on real estate for public or private use, which explicitly or implicitly transmit messages, signs, denominations, advertisements, or any type of written manifestation that alludes to The various terrorist groups or criminal associations of maras or gangs, and in particular those whose purpose is to allude to the territorial control of such groups or to transmit threats to the population in general, shall be punished with imprisonment of ten to fifteen years.

  The same penalty shall be imposed on those who, through the use of Communication and Information Technologies, radio, television, written or digital media, reproduce and transmit messages or communiqués originating or presumably originating from such criminal groups, which could generate anxiety and panic among the population in general."

One of the hypotheses is that with this law Bukele wanted to prevent anyone from revealing any information about the negotiations that might have taken place between Bukele and the gangs before he came to power. It should be noted again that this is only a hypothesis due to lack of evidence. However, in this law it is not very clear what type of content about the gangs can be disseminated. Can you talk about gangs in an informative or educational way? Or post a testimonial? This law not only prevents the publication of content that promotes the maras, but also any content that refer to them.

So, is Bukele a dictator? A dictatorship can be defined as “an absolute rule unrestricted by law, constitutions, or other political or social factors within the state. The original dictators, however, were magistrates in ancient Italian cities (including Rome) who were allocated absolute power during a period of emergency. Their power was neither arbitrary nor unaccountable, being subject to law and requiring retrospective justification. There were no such dictators after the beginning of the second century”[17] The definition of dictatorship is usually linked to the term’s tyranny; despotism; autocracy; absolutism; Caesarism; totalitarianism; fascism.

Indeed, in history, the concept of dictator appears during the Roman Republic, the dictator was elected by the Senate and a commission of citizens to rule for a limited period in time of emergency. Such a person had extraordinary powers of military nature (since that title was often granted in times of war). After the demise of the Roman Republic and mostly from the twentieth century on, the idea of dictatorship has been linked to an authoritarian style of governance and a tyrannical person with personalistic ambitions.

A dictatorship can be right-wing or left-wing. In general, dictatorships involve a one-party system of government or the near absence of political opposition, a repressive and even violent regime. Dictatorships tend to favor inequality through the unequal distribution of wealth, largely benefiting the dictator’s supporters. Definitions of dictatorship usually describe a system of government in which the ruler exercises all powers absolutely.

Nayib Bukele came to power democratically and obtained a legislative majority democratically (as many dictators did as well). However, there is still a political opposition in El Salvador with the ARENA and FMLN parties. In terms of inequalities, it still seems too early to analyze Bukele's results. The president had to face the COVID-19 pandemic that clearly worsened the problems the country had been facing for decades.  

Nevertheless, the president's undemocratic acts cannot be ignored. The president burst into Congress with armed forces to pressure deputies to vote on his law and budget. The problem of respect for human rights, innocent prisoners and the restriction of several freedoms such as freedom of expression can lead us to think Bukele is rather authoritarian. The prolongation of the State of Exception by the president allowed him to be reelected and get around the Constitution. A State of Emergency does not have the purpose to be endless. The government is no longer in step 5 of the Territorial Control Plan, so renewing the State of Exception does look like a legitimate situation.

As a conclusion, we must not ignore these acts and must not deny that it exists concerns about his authoritarian governance style.

Conclusion

Nayib Bukele came to the presidency of El Salvador with a totally new vision for his country. His goal was to give the country a new image internationally and to export his model to Central America and even to Latin America. It was a huge success. His style of governance inspired other leaders in the region. In January 2024, Ecuador's President Daniel Noboa declared war on gangs.

Bukele's first term focused on ending gangs, a sine qua non condition to change the economy and reduce inequalities. The president managed to restore security and peace in El Salvador through a rather authoritarian style, questioning the Salvadoran democracy. If it still is not very clear whether El Salvador has become a dictatorship, what is clear is that Bukele's presidency is a true hyper-presidency due to the concentration of powers.

However, President Nayib Bukele is extremely popular, and his popularity reaches beyond the country's borders, especially in countries that suffer from armed conflicts such as Colombia or Venezuela.

On the one hand, the general fatigue and weariness of citizens due to gang violence, widespread homicides, fear, and on the other hand the fragility of institutions constitute a mulch for authoritarian governments.

The main goal of Bukele's second term now is the eradication of corruption. Corruption is still present within the institutions of the State and the different local authorities of El Salvador. The several negotiations that happened between mayors of cities and the maras have weakened the authority of the State, increasingly discredited by corruption. The countless corruption cases have damaged the image of the State at the highest levels of government. Nayib Bukele must restore trust between citizens and the State.

[1] "El Salvador: Overview Overview," Text/HTML, World Bank, accessed January 29, 2025, https://www.bancomundial.org/es/country/elsalvador/overview.

[2] "Estimation of the Economic Cost in El Salvador - Network of Researchers of the Central Bank", April 2016.

[3] José Miguel Cruz, "The New Face of Street Gangs: The Phenomenon of Gangs in El Salvador" (International Florida University, 2016).

[4] Olivier CHRISTOPHE and Garance ROBERT, "The New Challenges of Violence in El Salvador", 2019.

[5] Olivier CHRISTOPHE and Garance ROBERT, «Les nouveaux enjeux de la violence à El Salvador», 2019. According to data from World Prison Brief fed by Birkbeck University in London.

[6] "El Salvador | " World Prison Brief", accessed 11 January 2025, https://www.prisonstudies.org/country/el-salvador.

[7] The Royal Academy defines populism as the "political tendency that aims to attract the popular classes". RAE-ASALE and RAE, "populism | Dictionary of the Spanish Language", "Dictionary of the Spanish Language" - Tercentenary Edition, accessed 18 January 2025, https://dle.rae.es/populismo.

In the history of Latin America, populist regimes tend to combine quite opposite ideologies such as left-wing authoritarianism or right-wing socialism. Populist regimes in the region emerged mainly in the context of a transition from a traditional society to a more modern society. The capitalist transition in the region was very rapid and even brutal, which excluded a large part of the population. Latin American populism has different characteristics from Western populism, for example.

Roger Bartra, "Populism and Democracy in Latin America. Notes and reflections», Problèmes d'Amérique latine, n.or 1 (2009): 11-25, https://shs.cairn.info/revista-problemes-d-amerique-latine-2009-1-page-11.

"Representative Democracy and Popular Classes" (1965), reproduced in G. Germani, Torcuato S. di Tella and Octavio Ianni, Populism and Class Contradictions in Latin America, Ediciones Era, Mexico, 1973, p. 29. A book by Octavio Ianni summarizes well the concerns of the left about the phenomenon: The Formation of the Populist State in Latin America, Era editions, 1975.

[9] Innova Servs, "As a result of the drop in crime, the State registers a savings of $60 million in the area of Health," Presidency of the Republic of El Salvador , January 10, 2023, https://www.presidencia.gob.sv/como-resultado-de-la-baja-en-la-criminalidad-el-estado-registra-un-ahorro-de-60-millones-en-el-area-de-salud/.

[10] Innova Servs, "Security strategies allow the recovery of more than 4,500 homes to increase access to the population", Presidency of the Republic of El Salvador, January 18, 2023, https://www.presidencia.gob.sv/estrategias-de-seguridad-permiten-recuperar-mas-de-4500-viviendas-para-incrementar-el-acceso-a-la-poblacion/.

[11] egobsv, "2023 was the safest year in the history of El Salvador", NATIONAL CIVIL POLICE, January 3, 2024, https://www.pnc.gob.sv/el-2023-fue-el-ano-mas-seguro-en-la-historia-del-el-salvador/.

[12] «CPI Bulletin December 2024", Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador, December 2024, https://www.bcr.gob.sv/documental/Inicio/apartado/10.

[13] "El Salvador: Overview Overview," Text/HTML, World Bank, accessed January 29, 2025, https://www.bancomundial.org/es/country/elsalvador/overview.

[14] "An Opportunity to Reduce Poverty and Inequality in El Salvador | Diagnosis of poverty for the country", World Bank, accessed February 3, 2025, https://www.bancomundial.org/es/country/elsalvador/publication/una-oportunidad-para-reducir-la-pobreza-y-la-desigualdad-en-el-salvador.

[15] Benjamin Moallic, "État d'exception: que se passe au Salvador?", Amérique latine 1, n.o 1 (1 de diciembre de 2022): 143-57,https://shs.cairn.info/revue-amerique-latine-2022-1-page-143 .

[16] The rule of law is the set of rules/laws organized in a hierarchical manner that all citizens, all institutions must respect, renouncing a part of their freedoms, to ensure the common good. The rule of law defines the rules that govern the functioning of a society. 

[17] “Dictatorship,” Oxford Reference, accessed March 1, 2025, https://doi.org/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095716950.